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ABSTRACT
A commonly used method of authentication on the Internet is to provide a combina-
tion of a username and a password. One way to make this method more secure is to
have long passwords. Single sign-on solutions have led to users having to remem-
ber fewer passwords and the passwords can, therefore, be longer than previously.
Different standardized frameworks can be used when implementing these types of
solutions, each with various advantages and disadvantages.
This thesis examines different authentication and authorization frameworks avail-
able to integrate a centralized single sign-on solution with an existing system. The
studied frameworks are OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML, LDAP, Kerberos
and RADIUS. These frameworks are reviewed and compared with each other on
a high level with an emphasis on security and features. A subset of them, namely
OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect and SAML, is chosen to be more extensively eval-
uated through integration with Hibox Systems’s internal solution. The reliability
of the system is tested through simulating heavy load conditions, while successful
throughput and system resource usage are used as metrics to determine the effi-
ciency of the system.
The integration of both OpenID Connect, combined with OAuth 2.0, and SAML
had a smooth user experience during normal authentication flows, but the combina-
tion of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect had an advantage over SAML during heavy
load conditions. The user experience was kept on a reasonable level for a larger
number of simultaneous users with the OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 integration
and the frameworks are therefore deemed to be better suited for the given use case.
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GLOSSARY
Standard
An agreed upon and approved, by general consent, model of how something
ought to work on a high level.
Protocol
Detailed description of how a standard works and how it should be imple-
mented.
Framework
Implementation of a well-defined protocol.
Principal
An entity that seeks to be authenticated by a system.
Supplicant
An entity at the edge of a point-to-point LAN that seeks to be authenticated.
Single sign-on
A system where one trusted entity can forwards proof of authentication ac-
cepted by other independent systems.
Request for Comments
A formal document drafted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
that has been put up for public review and revision.
Identity provider
A system component that is able to provide proof of authentication of an end
user.
v
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ABBREVIATIONS
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
XML Extensible Markup Language
PKCE Proof Key for Code Exchange
RFC Request for Comments
ACL Access-control list
SQL Structured Query Language
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
SSO Single sign-on
GUI Graphical user interface
CSS Cascading Style Sheets
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet, as we know it today, has existed for close to four decades and has
evolved much since its invention [1]. The original use case of the Internet and,
later, the world wide web was mainly simple communication and efficient informa-
tion sharing. The need for making the Internet more secure became more important
as the popularity of it started rising and the general public started using the world
wide web on a daily basis [2]. The Internet was no longer mostly used for search-
ing information, but also for tasks where sensitive information was shared over a
medium that had put a focus on being openly available to everyone. As the online
community grew, so did the attack surface and many new security threats capitalized
on this. At the same time as new security threats were recognized, it had also be-
come clear that the widespread use of the Internet had led to the fact that a complete
overhaul of the system had become very difficult, if not completely impossible, to
achieve [2]. The bigger stakeholders and organizations have now come together to
make the security of the Internet as good as possible with the given circumstances
and the Internet’s many inherent limitations [2].
One of the most crucial security problems on the Internet is that two entities
need to be able to verify the identity of each other. Website-specific certificates
and trusted certificate authorities have become the standard way of confirming the
authenticity of the website one is visiting [3]. How a website can verify the identity
of a user is a completely different problem. Every user having his own certificate
would not have the required usability and would lead to a single point of failure. The
most used method currently is to have a username and a password to authenticate
oneself to a service [4]. The problem then becomes that the user needs to keep
track of one username and password combination per service, as well as go through
1
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a cumbersome registration process every time a new one is opened. One push to
reduce the inconvenience is to use a trusted source as a central identity provider [5].
There are many ways an identity provider can function behind the scenes, but in
its most basic form a user logs in to the identity provider and the identity provider
then verifies the identity of the user to the service [5]. Security is crucial in any
publicly available system, and this has led to the availability of a multitude of dif-
ferent authentication frameworks and protocols that an identity provider can follow
and implement. By conforming to a certain protocol, services can work together
through an agreed-upon interface and the services are not tightly coupled together
[6]. Every protocol has its own strengths and weaknesses, and knowing which one
to choose for any certain project can be a difficult task.
Confirming the identity of the user is only the first step. The system also has
to verify that any authenticated user is authorized to do what the user is trying to
achieve. A centralized solution that can handle both authentication and authoriza-
tion can be split up into separate parts, and it is not always clear how these work
together.
1.1 Context
The implementation part of this thesis is done for, and in collaboration with, Hibox
Systems.
Hibox Systems have their own in-house extensive entertainment and manage-
ment system deployed on many hospitality, healthcare and Internet service provider
customers’ servers. To expedite the support process provided to the customer, while
also providing a more secure service, Hibox Systems have investigated the possib-
ility of establishing a centralized single sign-on server for its support and developer
personnel. The centralized service would need to be integrated with their own sys-
tem, as well as be easily configurable for any possible change in personnel or up-
dated level of customer security requirements.
This thesis will investigate the possible choices of frameworks, protocols and
services available that fulfill the security and functional requirements. Furthermore,
2
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a complete functional single sign-on server will be integrated with Hibox Systems’s
own service. The solution will be heavily scrutinized by the Hibox Systems internal
development team and only be taken past the proof-of-concept stage if it is deemed
secure enough for systems deployed in production.
1.2 Purpose of this thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to give an insight into available authentication and au-
thorization frameworks and protocols to show how these can be used in practice,
and to present differences between available ones. Different state-of-the-art authen-
tication and authorization frameworks and protocols will be examined to obtain a
clear high-level overview. The focus will be exclusively on frameworks that have
been proven to work securely and have been deployed widely, as well as extensively
studied and reviewed.
1.3 Methodology
There is a multitude of frameworks available in literature to screen through. The
initial selection of available state-of-the-art authentication and authorization frame-
works is a critical step in this thesis, and the selection of frameworks will be motiv-
ated. The selected frameworks will then be compared with each other and tested.
The frameworks will initially be compared by analyzing features, security and
complexity. Later, a subset of the initial frameworks will be integrated with Hi-
box Systems’s solution and tested in an offline environment. The tests will consist
of factors such as response times, throughput, and usability. The best performing
solution will be more thoroughly implemented.
1.4 Thesis structure
This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part outlines the current state
of the field. The second part focuses on the implementation of a system that uses a
3
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chosen subset of the initially selected authentication and authorization frameworks,
and by which criteria these frameworks may be evaluated. Finally, the evaluation
results are discussed, the implementation is reviewed and prospects are considered.
The second chapter presents a general overview of the field of study, while the
third chapter focuses on a high-level examination of the chosen frameworks. The
fourth chapter describes the different evaluation criteria and test setups. Only a
subset of viable frameworks will be used in the actual implementation, and the
motivation behind excluding some frameworks will therefore be discussed in this
chapter. In the fifth chapter, the implementation of a centralized authentication and
authorization integration is presented. The sixth chapter will focus on the result
analysis of the evaluation of frameworks and the implementation as a whole. In the
seventh and final chapter, the conclusions will be discussed and future prospects
will be deliberated.
4
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2 BACKGROUND
This chapter will present a general description of the field of user authentication
and authorization. Authentication and authorization will be discussed separately to
clarify the differences between the topics. The current state-of-the-art in the field
will be examined. Existing works that discuss topics similar to the one in this thesis
will be considered in the related work section, while specific frameworks will be
comprehensively presented in the next chapter.
2.1 Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of a user. Throughout the
relatively short history of the Internet, there have been many different proposals for
how authentication should be done online. Some proposals have been tried suc-
cessfully to some extent, but the most popular one has always been a username and
password combination [4]. Additions, such as 2-factor authentication and biometric
scanners have seen some use, even though the added security is not always worth
the extra inconvenience for the user [7].
Different solutions for making users use strong unique passwords for different
services have been tried and the use of password managers is at least moderately
widespread. Lately, there has been a push for using bigger corporations in the field,
such as Facebook and Google, as identity providers for many services around the
Internet [5]. This has led to fewer passwords needing to be remembered and man-
aged, but it has also led to a single point of failure. This method, which provides
simplicity and ease of use, has undoubtedly gained popularity among average users,
and the reduction of logins per day has led to extra layers of security, e.g. 2-factor
5
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authentication, not being as intrusive as in the technologies from earlier days.
2.2 Authorization
Authorization involves specifying the rights to access certain resources. In any sys-
tem that can be accessed by multiple users, what information can be accessed by
whom is a crucial factor in guaranteeing the security of the system. The user gen-
erally has to be reliably authenticated before the system gives access to the proper
resources, though an anonymous user may be given certain basic access, for ex-
ample access to read particular resources.
Managing what access rights a specific user or a group of users have can be done
through an access-control list, more commonly known as an ACL [8]. An ACL can
be updated to add or revoke access previously given. There are many different kinds
of ACLs available, but the main difference is the context in which they are used.
Some common contexts where ACLs are widely used are in file systems, databases,
networks, and active directories [8]. Some sort of ACL is available in almost every
modern operating system, for example in Windows, macOS and Linux, all of which
make extensive use out of ACLs. ACL is also deeply integrated into Structured
Query Language (SQL), the most widespread database query language.
There are other ways to store authorization information, such as role-based
access-control (RBAC) or not following any standard at all, but ACL is the most
widespread access-control model available [9].
2.3 Related work
Authentication and authorization are two very broad and widely studied topics in
the field of security. Most works are focused on describing one specific frame-
work or solution. This thesis emphasizes comparing solutions and seeing when one
framework might be better suited than another.
One of the available works that take a similar approach is "Securing digital iden-
tities in the cloud by selecting an apposite Federated Identity Management from
6
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SAML, OAuth and OpenID Connect" [10], but in this article they have only ex-
amined a subset of the frameworks selected in this thesis. The field is also ever-
changing, as updates on recommended practices are released and new problems are
recognized.
Another similar one is "On the Substantiative Experiment Study of Proxing As-
surance between OpenID and SAML: Technical Perspective for Private Information
Box Project of Japanese e-Government" [11], which looks at only two of the selec-
ted frameworks. The use case that they investigate is also very different from the
problem presented in this thesis in Chapter 4.
7
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3 FRAMEWORKS
There are many different frameworks and protocols available for authentication and
authorization, both proprietary and openly available standards. This thesis will fo-
cus on a subset of popular protocols, namely OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML,
LDAP, Kerberos and RADIUS. The protocols listed were chosen due to their recur-
ring prevalence in papers and their general widespread use [12][13][14][15][16][17].
All of the chosen protocols had the possibility to fulfill the requirements of the ini-
tial use case presented by Hibox Systems, where an identity provider should provide
authentication and authorization to a service provider.
Different frameworks have different use cases, advantages and disadvantages.
Frameworks such as Kerberos and RADIUS have been built mostly for an internal
company security solution with a focus on high security and some specialized fea-
tures and logging. The OAuth2 framework is by design only meant to be used for
authorization, and has been extended to have a standardized method of providing
authentication by the OpenID Connect identity layer. LDAP is a protocol to au-
thenticate and authorize access to available resources. SAML is an advanced open
standard for transferring authentication and authorization data between different en-
tities.
In this chapter, these frameworks will be reviewed and described concisely to
present an overview of in which environment each framework is intended to be
used in, as well as what features and limitations should be taken into account when
employing them.
8
Ken Erikson
3.1 OAuth 2.0
The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework is a framework that enables a third-party
application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service [18]. OAuth 2.0 has since its
official release in 2012 quickly become the industry-leading framework for limiting
access to exposed services. Companies started to experiment with their already
available OAuth 2.0 solution for ways to use it for authentication. The service-
specific hacks led to the need for OpenID Connect, which extended OAuth 2.0 with
a standardized way of authentication [19].
In normal client-server authentication flows, a third-party application needs to
have direct access to the client’s credentials in order to access a restricted resource
[18]. This leads to third-party applications having unnecessarily extensive access,
and a single compromised third party can lead to a resource owner’s credentials
becoming completely compromised. OAuth 2.0 adds an authorization layer and
separates the client from the resource owner and limits the access of the third-party
to only what is required. A set of credentials other than those of the resource owner
is shared with the third party, and if the third party is compromised, those credentials
can be invalidated without affecting the resource owner [18].
OAuth 2.0 is constantly being updated and revised by the IETF OAuth Work-
ing Group and the general community, who all try to reach a common consensus.
The goal of any revision is to increase the security of OAuth 2.0 in general and to
make sure the framework reflects actual use cases. Recommendations for how the
framework should be used are presented by the most recently published OAuth 2.0
Security Best Current Practice [20]. New recommendations have historically been
created when browser technologies have added security features that the framework
can utilize. There have been people voicing ideas of moving to version 2.1 of the
OAuth framework to simplify all the current additions and recommended practices
into one single Request for Comments (RFC) [21].
The OAuth 2.0 framework defines a number of grant types. A grant type refers
to how an application can acquire an access token. There are four different OAuth
2.0 authorization grant types available in the original OAuth 2.0 framework specific-
9
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Figure 3.1: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow.
ation, as well as the separate Refresh token grant type. There are also extensions
available and completely new grant types proposed [18].
The grant types present in the current specifications are Authorization Code,
Client Credentials, Resource Owner Password Credentials, Implicit, Refresh Token
and Device Code [18]. All of these grant types represent different supported ways
for an application to gain an authorization token, which in turn can be used to gain
access to restricted resources of the service provider.
The Authorization Code grant type is the most common grant type and can be
used by both web apps and native apps [22] and is visualized in Figure 3.1. The
Authorization Code flow starts when the application sends the user to the OAuth
2.0 server and the user is required to approve the application’s authorization request
for the flow to continue [18]. The user is then sent back to the application with an
Authorization Code. The application uses the Authorization Code together with its
own configured shared secret to procure the actual access token over a secure back
channel. The Authorization Code flow only exposes the Authorization Code, not
the token, to the inherently insecure client. The Authorization Code cannot be used
for anything unless you also have the shared secret of the application. The Author-
ization Code flow has been extended with Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
intended mainly for applications without the ability to securely store a shared secret,
10
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but it is recommended that all clients use PKCE for the added verification [20].
The Client Credentials grant type is used by applications to gain access to their
own resources [18]. The application sends a request containing a client identifier
and a secret to the OAuth 2.0 provider through a secure back channel. A response
containing an authorization token is returned if the client credentials are success-
fully validated.
The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant type is used when the applic-
ation sends the user credentials of the resource owner to the OAuth 2.0 provider
in exchange for an access token [18]. This flow is not recommended, because the
application requires full knowledge of the user’s credentials and other grant types
provide a more secure flow.
The Implicit grant type starts like the Authorization Code grant type with a
redirect from the application to the OAuth 2.0 provider for approval of the author-
ization request [18]. The user is then sent back to the application with the access
token included in the redirection. The Implicit authorization flow was previously
recommended for clients without a secure way to store a secret, but has been super-
seded by using the Authorization Code grant with Proof Key for Code Exchange as
an added security measure [20]. The insecurities were known when OAuth 2.0 was
proposed, but no easy solution was possible with the available browser technologies
and their limitations.
The Refresh Token grant type is used to obtain a new valid access token [18].
A refresh token is sent alongside the access token during the successful authoriz-
ation using another grant type. The refresh token has a longer valid period than
an access token. The application is therefore forced to regularly retrieve a new ac-
cess token by sending a request containing the refresh token together with possible
client credentials. No additional authentication is required, because a valid refresh
token implies that the user has already successfully authenticated with the identity
provider.
The Device Code authorization grant type was added as an extension to the
original OAuth 2.0 framework specification in order to add an official way of au-
thenticating devices where inputting a password is impractical, such as televisions
11
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Figure 3.2: OAuth 2.0 network diagram.
and printers [23]. The device executes an authorization request containing a device
code and a client identifier. The device then begins polling an endpoint until the user
has successfully authorized the request by entering the code visible on the device
through some other medium more suited for inputting user credentials, e.g. a phone
or a computer.
There have been security issues with certain grant types in the past and the
current best recommendations have been updated to reflect these [20]. The Client
Credentials and Resource Owner Password Credentials grant types should never be
used in a context so that the shared secrets and passwords are revealed to a third-
party application. The implicit grant type should be disabled if possible and instead,
the Authorization Code grant type should be used with the PKCE extension [20].
The PKCE extension has made the Authorization Code grant type applicable in
most common authorization situations and is the preferred grant type, due to its in-
herent security. The security of the Authorization Code grant type is mainly due to
the fact that the access token is only transmitted through the secure back channel,
which can be seen in Figure 3.2. The secure back channel describes how requests
are sent directly from the service provider to the identity provider and is used to
exchange authorization grants for tokens. Sending Requests through the back chan-
nel is deemed to be more secure than sending requests through the browser of the
12
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end user, because of the higher risk of the access token being shared or stolen while
passing through an untrusted user agent [24].
The security of the framework is not exclusively based on selecting the most
secure usable grant type. The framework implementation is critical for the level of
security of the system [25]. It is therefore recommended to use one of the many
publicly available libraries, to protect the users and service providers by employing
code examined and approved by others.
In conclusion, OAuth 2.0 is an ever-evolving framework that describes how au-
thorization can be done efficiently and with a high level of security, as long as
recommended grant types are used and the framework has been correctly imple-
mented according to the protocol specifications.
3.2 OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect is a standardized identity layer to be used with the OAuth 2.0
protocol [26]. It extends the authorization capabilities of the OAuth 2.0 protocol
by allowing clients to verify the identity of an end user based on the authentication
performed by the Authorization Server [26]. Additionally, the OpenID Connect
identity layer also exposes an endpoint, from which basic profile information about
the end user can be retrieved [26].
The need for OpenID Connect came from when multiple large companies with
a centralized login solution started building their own service-specific hack on top
of OAuth 2.0 to enable the authentication flow to authenticate users [19]. The solu-
tion of the companies resembled the OpenID Connect flow, but using separate non-
standardized specifications led to much confusion and complications when trying
to integrate a specific login flow to one’s own service [19].
OpenID Connect standardized all the messages to be sent during a login transac-
tion [26]. Consequently, if a service has been integrated with one OpenID identity
provider, then the service could be integrated against any number of other OpenID
identity providers without much additional configuration.
The OpenID Connect authentication flow follows the flow of the configured
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OAuth 2.0 authorization. The identity provider may readily decide what OAuth
2.0 flows are accepted by the authorization server. The choice of OAuth 2.0 flow
is an important determiner for the security of the OpenID Connect solution. The
scope "openid" is included in the initial request by the client, which informs the
server that the client attempts to initiate an OpenID Connect exchange [26]. After
the identity provider receives successful authorization by the resource owner, an
ID token is sent to the client. The ID token, which is encoded as a JSON Web
Token (JWT), contains basic profile information of the resource owner, as well as
information about the token itself. In addition, there is also a possibility for the
JWT to be signed and encrypted for additional verification and safety [26].
Due to the multiple supported OpenID Connect flows, the security of OpenID
Connect rests mostly on the implementation of the framework and how well it con-
forms to the most recent recommended specifications. The security is also limited
by the allowed OAuth 2.0 grant types that the underlying server accepts. For nor-
mal resource owner login flows, the Authorization Code grant type with the PKCE
extension should be used when possible for ensuring maximum possible security
[20]. There are optional security measures, for example, additional encryption and
certificate signatures, defined in the framework specifications for when security is
paramount [26].
The OpenID Connect protocol was designed with the sole purpose of creating an
identity protocol that was simple for developers to integrate with existing systems
[27]. This has led to the protocol being heavily used by large identity providers,
such as Google, which in turn has led to extensive integration with a multitude of
both bigger and smaller services [5]. The fast adaption rate of OpenID Connect
can also be explained by the support of single-page web applications and mobile
applications, where there is no secure way to store sensitive information.
The OpenID Connect protocol standardizes some features that are optional in
the OAuth 2.0 specifications [28]. For example, scopes are always to be included
in an OpenID Connect exchange, and identity providers are required to support
dynamic registration of clients and endpoint discovery. Dynamic registration and
endpoint discovery are both extremely helpful in automating and simplifying the
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integration with existing systems. The endpoint discovery means that the OpenID
Connect provider exposes metadata of the available endpoints of the server at a
well-known URL [26].
To conclude, OpenID Connect is an authentication protocol that is simple to
integrate with existing services and secure even without its optional extra security
features. The broad use of OpenID Connect means that the integration to additional
services after the first one is very simple.
3.3 SAML
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is a standard that defines a
framework used for exchanging security information between entities through a
common XML framework [29]. The current version of the standard is SAML 2.0,
which was released in its final revision in 2005.
For a long time, SAML has been one of the most popular frameworks for cent-
ralized login among corporations and organizations, such as universities [30]. Be-
cause SAML has been integrated with a variety of available enterprise software, it
is often required by larger entities. This, in turn, has led to that software aimed
towards such entities come with SAML integration. The adaption of newer tech-
nologies in these fields is slower than in many other areas, due to the lack of clear
benefits of transitioning from a functioning system. The migration cost of large de-
ployed systems has to be weighed against the improvement in other areas, such as
security, ease of maintenance and integrations with new systems.
A SAML single sign-on login flow consists of an identity provider and a ser-
vice provider as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The identity provider has knowledge of
the login credentials of all users in the system, as well as an internal list of all the
available service providers in the system. The user is, in the most basic flow, redir-
ected to the identity provider when trying to access a service provider. The identity
provider issues an authentication assertion to the user who successfully manages
to authenticate, and the assertion can then be used to gain access to the requested
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Figure 3.3: SAML authentication flow.
service [29].
The issued authentication assertion is trusted by the service provider because
of the trust relationship that has been established between the identity and service
providers during the initial configuration of the system. The trust relationship is
established by sharing a metadata description of the providers. The metadata de-
scribes, for instance, what the authentication information is expected to look like,
and what certificates will be used to sign the data to guarantee the validity of the
messages sent [29].
SAML can be used by multiple organizations to form a login federation, where
users of all member organizations can use a common login flow to access a shared
service [30]. Federations are mainly used in very large companies and universities.
Troubleshooting SAML systems is often complicated, due to the huge number
of available configuration options [31]. Different services are often configured so
that the identity provider needs to send SAML assertions in a very specific format.
The SAML identity provider may be following all the requirements in the SAML
protocol, but if the service provider does not follow them, or is otherwise erro-
neously configured, there is nothing the identity provider can reconfigure to make it
succeed.
SAML is a clearly standardized framework and much of its popularity comes
from the fact that it is clear how to integrate with it, especially compared to an
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unstandardized approach [29]. Any service that follows the protocol specifications
can be configured to authenticate to a SAML identity provider with minimal con-
figuration. Both the SAML service provider and identity provider can provide each
other with an XML metadata file, which describes what type of messages both of
the systems are expecting.
The widespread use of the framework has also led to much support being avail-
able for both developers and administrators. There are pre-made libraries available
for most popular programming languages, meaning that developers very seldom
need to implement their own solution. Administrators have, apart from the offi-
cial specifications, over a decade of documented tutorials and troubleshooting help
available since the release of the current version of the standard in 2005 [29].
The SAML protocol has over the years been heavily audited and scrutinized,
due to its extensive use in fields where wrongfully granted access could leak private
and sensitive information to unauthorized users and entities [32].
The user experience for the user, as long as the system is properly configured,
is very simple and, as with the OpenID Connect, very minor user interaction is
needed apart from providing credentials [31]. The user does not need to be aware
of the security assertions and exchanges that happen behind the scenes.
All in all, SAML is a popular protocol that is widely used in corporations and
educational establishments. Its extensive use has led to a heavily scrutinized stand-
ard, where many of its possible angles of attack have been identified. The user of
the resulting system only provides his login credentials, and is not required to have
any knowledge of the complicated security that happens under the hood.
3.4 LDAP
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a way to provide access to
directory services distributed over a network [33]. It is an efficient way to quickly
find seldom updated data. LDAP was originally designed as a way to simplify ac-
cess to a complex enterprise directory system called the X.500, but it can also be
used to provide single sign-on where a user needs to gain access to multiple services
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with the same credentials. LDAP originally had no authentication and security in-
tegrated, as this was only added in LDAP version 3 as the Simple Authentication
and Security Layer (SASL) [34]. SASL includes a variety of authentication types,
including possibilities for making use of two-factor authentication [35].
In LDAP, four standard information models are defined to fully describe what
kind of information can be stored in the directories and what it is capable of doing
with the stored information. The four models are the Information Model, Naming
Model, Functional Model and Security Model [36].
The Information Model defines what type of information an LDAP directory
can store. The Naming Model specifies how information in an LDAP directory is
named, organized and referenced. The Functional Model defines how information
in an LDAP directory can be accessed, updated and what can be done with it. The
Security Model determines what privileges are needed to access specific informa-
tion in an LDAP directory and how information can be secured [36].
The Lightweight part of the LDAP name comes from its strive to be as efficient
as possible, while including as many crucial features as possible from the X.500
specification [33]. Many features that were deemed unnecessary were left out of
the protocol completely. LDAP can also make use of long-lasting connections,
which can be kept alive for days. This may be more efficient than HTTP-based
protocols, which often use relatively short-lasting connections, due to being able
to resume active connections rather than having to negotiate sessions and request a
TLS connection [35].
LDAP is a popular framework to store user credentials in large and small cor-
porations alike. It has been integrated with various popular software that average
employees and administrators interact with sometimes multiple times per day, for
example OpenVPN, Kubernetes and Docker. As such, their protocol has been heav-
ily scrutinized and tested. LDAP is a crucial part of companies’ IT infrastructure,
and this has led to a constant strive for increased performance and scalability for the
protocol that had its most recent version released in 1997 [35].
The login flow for LDAP is very straightforward both for the user and behind
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Figure 3.4: LDAP flow.
the scenes as visualized in Figure 3.4. The user supplies his user credentials and
then the client sends them to the LDAP server for verification [33]. There are no
additional checks or sessions. If the credentials are successfully verified, then the
user is deemed to be properly authenticated.
The LDAP protocol was originally created without any authentication in the
specifications, this was only added later [34]. The problem with using LDAP as a
makeshift single sign-on service is that it is not built for securely transmitting lo-
gin credentials over the public internet. It is generally not recommended to use as
an identity provider outside a secure network or with untrusted third-party applic-
ations, due to the fact that the user has to provide his complete credentials. These
credentials can then be used by anyone to impersonate the original user using a valid
form of authentication.
Applications that are used over the open Internet are often connected to an iden-
tity provider using another framework [37]. That identity provider can then be
connected securely to an LDAP server and use that as the identity source of truth.
To sum up, LDAP is a lightweight protocol that can be used to access distributed
directory services that follow the X.500 specification [33]. A common use case is
to store usernames and passwords in an LDAP server, which then applications can
use as an identity provider [37]. The application and LDAP server should be on the
same secure network.
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3.5 Kerberos
The Kerberos network authentication service is a protocol based on the model
presented by Needham and Schroeder [38] which was developed in the 1980s as
a part of MIT’s Project Athena [39], and is currently on its fifth version [40]. The
protocol enables secure verification of principals, which are an entities that seek to
be authenticated by a system, over open networks. Everything transmitted over the
network is assumed to be openly readable and modifiable.
Kerberos uses strong cryptography to achieve this [41]. When new clients are
registered to the Kerberos system, a private key is shared between the server and the
client. The private key can be any long string, for example an encrypted password
[38].
The authentication process starts by the principal authenticating itself to the key
distribution center using the pre-shared private key, as well as requesting access to
a specific application server. Upon being successfully authenticated, the principal
receives a session key and a ticket-granting ticket which can, during a limited time,
be used to access the agreed-upon application server [39]. The integrity of the ticket
is verified by confirming that the shared encryption key can be used to decrypt it.
The ticket-granting ticket, together with an authenticator, is sent to the application
server for verification. The most important fields in authenticator are the current
time, a checksum, and an optional encryption key, all of which are encrypted with
the session key also included in the ticket-granting ticket [39]. The ticket-granting
ticket and session key are saved by the system, so that the password does not have
to be saved in memory for the duration of the session. The principal can then access
multiple resources without constantly having to reinsert the password [40].
The way the secret keys are distributed in a Kerberos system can be seen in Fig-
ure 3.5. All communication between the different entities in the system is encrypted
by the shared keys [40]. This ensures that the entities always can trust that all mes-
sages only can be read by the intended party. The keys shared between the client and
the authentication server is based on the username and password of the supplicant.
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Figure 3.5: The entities and shared keys in a Kerberos system.
The other shared keys are configured during the initial configuration. The resource
server containing the resources and services requested is, for instance, only aware
of the secret key shared with the ticket-granting server and only trusts messages
from that server. This chain of encryption ensures that only users passing through
the whole authentication chain is provided with access to the requested resources.
The Kerberos protocol contains security safeguards against replay attacks, where
successful authentication requests are recorded and then replayed with the intent of
tricking the system into authenticating the entity sending the copied request. This
is done by checking the timestamp of every request and rejecting it if the timestamp
is the same as a previous authenticated request [40]. The timestamp is also veri-
fied to be within, by default, five minutes of the local authenticator server time in
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). This requirement leads to that all servers that
have to be accessed through the Kerberos system have to be within 5 minutes of
each other, which can be a challenge for the network administrators. Different time
zones can make this more complicated for the administrators, because the time is
always converted to UTC. There are different time services available to automate
this after some configuration, but no service is infallible and authentication errors
due to skewed clocks can become very complex [42].
The main security advantage of Kerberos is that no passwords are transmitted
in plain text over any parts of the network. All services that are sending plain text
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passwords over the network need to either be integrated to be used with Kerberos
or entirely removed from the network to get any real increase in security from using
Kerberos [43]. Integrating Kerberos with applications that do not support it may
require major programming efforts, which could be infeasible, especially for closed-
source software [43].
As with any authentication system, the system is only secure if the trusted au-
thenticator stays uncompromised. In the case of Kerberos, the system is only secure
as long as the ticket issuer is kept secure [43]. The system builds on that the ticket
issuer is trusted by all other parts of the system and tickets that are issued can be
used to gain access to services and impersonate users.
To conclude, Kerberos is a secure authentication and authorization protocol with
strict safety measures that ensure that a supplicant can safely authenticate with re-
quests going over both secure and insecure networks, as long as the trusted entities
are uncompromised. These strict safety measures also mean that the framework can
become very complicated to configure for the network administrators, as well as
difficult to successfully troubleshoot. The strict requirement of the server having
the same time, within a small margin of error, is one part of the protocol that may
end up causing a troublesome user experience. Kerberos is, however, a very secure
system with a fluid user experience if everything is implemented and configured
correctly.
3.6 RADIUS
RADIUS stands for "Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service" and is a protocol
for carrying authentication, authorization and configuration information between a
Network Access Server (NAS), to which a supplicant has initiated an authentication
request, and an authentication server [44]. RADIUS is an all-in-one AAA (Authen-
tication, Authorization and Accounting) protocol and a standard proposed by IETF
[44]. The authentication part establishes how the identity of a supplicant can be
confirmed. What an authenticated supplicant is allowed to do and access in the
system is described by the authorization part. The Accounting part of this protocol
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defines how to log and keep track of any interaction with the RADIUS service and
is out of the scope of this thesis.
RADIUS is a very extensible network [44] and one of the reasons it is still being
used by many enterprises. RADIUS is, for example, not reliant on how the users
of the system are stored, and if the identity source is locally integrated with the
RADIUS server, in a directory service or in a cloud solution, which is becoming
more popular [45]. The administrators then only have to configure the RADIUS
server to point to the user managing system being used currently, if one already
exists.
The RADIUS system consists of a centralized RADIUS server and any number
of RADIUS clients. The server and clients communicate with each other through
standard IP protocols, either TCP or UDP, operating on the port 1812, which is
specifically reserved for RADIUS exchanges [44]. The RADIUS clients do not
have to be on the same network as the RADIUS server, but extra security measures
should be considered if RADIUS messages are sent over an insecure network.
The default security of RADIUS uses a shared secret along with the MD5 hash-
ing algorithm to encrypt parts of the messages. The hashing is only performed on
the password and other data that can be seen as sensitive, such as the username,
is sent as part of the RADIUS message payload in plain text [46]. MD5 has also
proven to be insufficiently secure and is not recommended to be used in applications
where security is important [46].
Other more secure standards for encrypting the RADIUS messages are avail-
able, especially for when the RADIUS server sends messages over open networks.
The added security can be by wrapping the exchanges in a Transport Layer Security
(TLS) encrypted stream [47], as is the standard for most secure websites. Most RA-
DIUS implementations also support RADIUS client-specific certificates, that can
be used to encrypt all communication. Each client then must have a certificate in-
stalled and then the client must be configured with the certificate from the RADIUS
server.
RADIUS was originally made for authenticating and authorizing access to net-
work services, but there is no limitation in the protocol to authenticate users to any
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Figure 3.6: The RADIUS request and possible responses.
other type of services [44]. There are, however, features that are available in other
single sign-on solutions that are not included in RADIUS, such as limited-time au-
thentication and extra authorization options.
A normal use case for the RADIUS systems is to have the entry points to the
network behind RADIUS authentication [44]. In these cases, the access points are
RADIUS clients. One of the largest examples of this is the "eduroam" network,
which provides internet access around education establishments in over a thousand
countries [48]. The authentication to this network is provided through a unified
RADIUS network.
The requests executed in a normal RADIUS exchange are visualized in Figure
3.6. The exchange starts with the user trying to authenticate with the RADIUS
client, which then sends an Access-Request, containing the provided username and
password, to the RADIUS server [44]. The RADIUS server then verifies that the
client knows a previously configured shared secret and that the user credentials are
correct. The RADIUS server then responds with either Access-Accept or Access-
Rejected, with an optional Access-Challenge response as an extra security measure.
If the authentication is successful it can also be used to access certain configured
services on the network, using RADIUS as a single sign-on service [44].
As an added security measure, the RADIUS server can on a successful authen-
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tication return an Access-Challenge response [44]. The Access-Challenge response
contains a number, which then has to be put through a series of calculations, through
e.g. some software, to generate the correct expected response. The correct response
should only be able to be calculated by trusted users. The RADIUS server then
sends an Access-Accept or Access-Rejected based on if the response to the chal-
lenge was correct. For additional security, another Access-Challenge response can
be sent on a success [44].
In conclusion, RADIUS is a protocol designed to be an all-in-one AAA solution
and has seen widespread use in providing access to network services. A RADIUS
network builds on RADIUS servers and clients having a trust relationship with each
other, and RADIUS clients will have to be trusted with the credentials of the user.
The RADIUS framework was not made explicitly for authentication of users on
the web, and as such there are certain limitations of what the framework can do,
compared to other solutions.
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4 EVALUATION SETUPS
The evaluation and comparison of the frameworks focus on such aspects that are
important in the field of security, namely reliability, scalability and safety.
To provide a clear and focused evaluation of the most promising frameworks,
only a few of the initially chosen ones are presented in the latter parts of this thesis.
The frameworks chosen to be more extensively tested are SAML and OAuth 2.0
with OpenID Connect as a security layer. The rest of the originally chosen frame-
works are only discussed on a purely theoretical level using available previous
works and framework specifications.
The use case, for which the chosen frameworks should function, is to be able to
sign in to a service provider by authentication with a separate identity provider. The
service provider and identity provider may be configured to form a trust relation-
ship between the two entities. The end user, service provider and identity provider
may be on three separate networks and any communication must be transmitted se-
curely over the open Internet as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The authentication must
be time-limited, so that one login does not give access to the service provider for an
indefinite amount of time. There must be a possibility for the identity provider to
give a closer specification of what the authenticated user is authorized to do while
signed into the service. The user experience must be seamless, as not to make the
workflow of the users more complicated than necessary, while still being secure.
The requirements have been evolving during the course of this thesis and some
frameworks that were an option during the beginning of the thesis are no longer a
very suitable option. The main change in requirements is that the identity provider
and service must be able to be on separate networks, and not within the same secure
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Figure 4.1: Network diagram of the use case.
network as it was specified when work began on this thesis.
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect were chosen to be tested together to provide
a complete authentication and authorization solution. The combination of the two
frameworks has been heavily utilized by highly regarded corporations in the field
of security, for instance Google and Microsoft [15]. The user experience is very
streamlined with many unnecessary steps omitted. The requirements for the given
use case is fully handled by the combination of the two frameworks.
SAML was chosen to be tested more thoroughly due to it fitting all of the re-
quirements specified for the use case, as well as being a generally secure and heavily
analyzed framework. SAML has seen much use in large corporations and universit-
ies for similar use cases, and has therefore been laboriously scrutinized and tested
in public [32].
LDAP was not chosen as one of the frameworks to be integrated with Hibox
Systems’s solution because of the incompatibility with being used securely over the
open Internet. Opening up an LDAP server directly to the public internet is not
recommended, even if some encryption is used [49]. Other requirements, such as
lack of standardized time-limited authentication, made LDAP a mediocre choice for
the given use case.
Kerberos was deemed to be too complicated during the configuration phase and
the user experience is not the most streamlined, at least if any errors are encountered.
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Also, the maintenance required to keep a Kerberos system functional is not an easy
task for an administrator. Kerberos was therefore regarded as a poor choice and
more promising frameworks were chosen in the continued testing instead of Ker-
beros.
RADIUS is a framework that also was chosen to be omitted. RADIUS is built
more for on-premise network authentication and authorization. To adapt it to an
over the Internet single sign-on solution would not be following the use case which
RADIUS was initially designed for and the security would be questionable. This is
not to say that a secure solution would be impossible to achieve using this frame-
work, but there are other frameworks, which have been more heavily scrutinized in
these environments.
4.1 Criteria
The chosen frameworks are evaluated based on how reliable and efficient the frame-
works are in practice. The frameworks are compared with each other based on
theory and how well the integration of each of the frameworks functions.
The safety levels of each framework are compared with each other based on
previous works and protocol descriptions. Most of the protocols describe ways to
increase security by enabling extra security features, but this thesis focuses on re-
commended normal practices to ensure compatibility with as many implementations
of the protocols as possible.
The reliability of the system is based on stability during an extended stress test.
The stability during the stress test was measured by keeping track of the rate of
erroneous responses from both the Hibox server and the identity provider server.
The servers were monitored closely for any crashes or prolonged unresponsiveness,
both on the identity provider and the Hibox server. The stress test featured different
amounts of simultaneous emulated user agents from one to a thousand.
The efficiency of the solution is mainly measured by the actual throughput of
users during emulated normal login flows. The successful throughput of users per
second were recorded. The bytes sent and received per second by the user agents of
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the end users were also be documented and calculated. The ratio between bytes and
throughput is expected to give some indication of how efficient the login flow is for
the framework in question.
The CPU and RAM were monitored on both the identity provider server and
the Hibox server during the time the simulated login flows are executed. The focus
was on the difference between idle and testing scenarios. The relative increase
during different loads is used to determine what framework is most suitable for
what number of expected users.
4.2 Test setup
The test is conducted by taking SAML and OAuth 2.0 with OpenID Connect as
an identity layer and integrating them with Hibox Systems’s solution and running
stress tests on the integrations. The stress tests involve emulating heavy load con-
ditions by sending up to a thousand login requests within a short time frame. The
successful throughput of test users, request timings and system resource usage is
used to determine the efficiency of the system.
The test setup featured four entities, namely a router, an identity provider server,
a server running Hibox Systems’s solution and a computer that simulated all end-
user browsers and their requests. Each of the entities is presented separately in this
section of this thesis.
4.2.1 Network setup
The router functioned as a central hub which all requests had to pass through as can
be seen in Figure 4.2. All connections to the router were through wired Ethernet
connections to avoid variable wireless network delays and needless package losses
due to wireless interference. Except for obligatory operating system requests that
could not be disabled with reasonable efforts, no unnecessary network traffic was
present at the time of the testing. The connection to the public Internet was disabled
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Figure 4.2: Network diagram of the test setup.
during testing, as it was not necessary for testing purposes.
4.2.2 Identity provider server
The identity provider server is a Gluu identity and access management server [50].
The server was chosen from all the available solutions because of its support for
both SAML and OpenID Connect with only minor configuration needed.
The Gluu identity server was required to be run on a UNIX based system. The
chosen distribution was Ubuntu 18.04 with GUI disabled as to have an as efficient
system as possible. All unnecessary background services were disabled to free up
as much of the system resources for the identity server.
There was some initial effort expended to assess how complicated it would be
to implement an identity provider without using already openly available solutions.
Different libraries were tested and implementations completely without using any
libraries were considered. The advantages of these approaches would be to have full
control of the login flows and possibilities to optimize them for the given use case.
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The main disadvantage, that led to the using of an open-source available solution,
was that the implementations would be of different quality levels. There is then an
increased risk of comparing specific implementations, rather than the frameworks
in question. The risk is not eradicated by using an open-source solution, but the
chance that they are of similar quality is higher if they are bundled together in the
same solution. The difference between the two frameworks when collecting system
resource usage is also reduced if both can be run on the same system simultaneously
and be connected to the same back end. The whole system then has the same idling
memory usage and has the same storage for the registered users, which removes
some variable factors from the test setup.
The identity provider server was configured to accept both SAML and OpenID
Connect as valid login flows from the Hibox server. The Hibox server was added
to a SAML trusted relationship by exchanging XML files containing metadata in-
formation about the SAML login flow configuration of both the identity provider
server and Hibox server. The Hibox server was also added as an OpenID Connect
client to the Gluu identity server. The configuration consisted of adding the OpenID
Connect endpoints available on the Hibox server, as well as generating a client iden-
tifier and a password. The Authorization Code grant type was the only OAuth 2.0
grant type to be configured to verify that only secure Authorization Code requests
are accepted by the system during the authentication flow following from OpenID
Connect exchanges.
4.2.3 Hibox server
Hibox Systems’s solution is represented with a separate server, which is called the
Hibox server, connected to the test network as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The
relevant implementation details of how the frameworks have been integrated with
the Hibox System’s solution is provided in Chapter 5.
The Hibox server was run with Ubuntu 18.04 [51] as the operating system due
to the requirements of the underlying Hibox System’s solution. The GUI, as well as
unnecessary background services, was disabled to keep as much as possible of the
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system resources available for the authentication flow of the simulated users.
The Hibox server provided separate endpoints for both SAML and OpenID Con-
nect login flows. Both endpoints were active during the whole testing process, as
to not change the idle resource usage of the system when changing which of the
frameworks were tested. Both of the frameworks provided flows which led to an
authenticated session by the session handler of the underlying Hibox Systems’s
solution.
4.2.4 Load testing tool
The user agents of the end users are simulated with Apache JMeter, which is an
open-source load testing tool that can be used to test and measure the performance
of, mainly, web applications [52].
The JMeter application was run on a Windows 10 system. The application is
built on Java, and is therefore completely portable to most operating systems. Win-
dows 10 was chosen due to the availability of a computer with Windows 10 installed
that was deemed to be powerful enough to prevent it from being a bottleneck in the
different testing scenarios. The added convenience of having the application run-
ning on the same system that the data processing applications were run on led to
a faster iteration process, and more tests could be run in a shorter time frame than
would otherwise be possible.
JMeter was run without a GUI to make sure all available resources could be
used by the sending and receiving of simulated authentication-related requests. The
results were stored and then processed afterwards with the JMeter application itself,
so relevant timing averages, error rates and throughput could be extracted from the
saved request data. The data was then processed and organized to be visualized in
Chapter 6.
Both the SAML and OpenID Connect login flows was recorded by sending all
browser requests through a proxy provided by the JMeter application while using
the browser to complete authentication flows for both frameworks. The requests are
then replayed to simulate as many web browsers as needed to mimic a high load
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scenario.
Each simulated user agent has its headers and cache handled separately. Every
new login exchange has an empty cache and has an unauthenticated session.
The simulated authentication flow does not execute website JavaScript and CSS
styling, which could make the test differ from a real-world scenario, by changing the
timing between requests and not fetching extra resources from the servers. There
is also no delay between the user being able to input the login credentials and the
providing of them, as this was concluded to not change the results other than offset-
ting the response times of the results.
4.3 Test scenarios
The chosen test scenarios to be executed are simulations of a number of users. Each
simulation was to be simulated over a certain period of time to simulate a possible
real-world scenario, where it is unlikely that too many users try to access the service
at the exact same time. In addition, to consolidate the validity of the results, all of
the tests would be run multiple times.
The JMeter application would mimic real-world scenarios by simulating a var-
ied number of user agents. The number of user agents to simulate were chosen to be
1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 and 1000. These numbers were chosen to provide
various test scenarios where the systems would be tested thoroughly. The wide
range of number of users also led to the logarithmic scale having to be used when
visualizing the results, and roughly doubling every number each iteration leads to
clearly explanatory graphs.
The requests simulating the user behaviours spread out over a set time span
to emulate real-world scenarios. The time over which the requests were spread
out is ten seconds. This was chosen to make sure that the integration would stay
responsive during really short periods of intense usage and still not be unrealistic.
It should be noted that, while the initial requests were sent over ten seconds, the
responses were not time-limited and could continue execution until they were either
successful or failed.
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The test scenarios were all repeated to obtain more trustworthy results that have
been calculated from the average of all test runs. All tests were run ten times,
making a total of two hundred test runs, due to the ten different number of users to
simulate and two different frameworks.
4.4 Performance metrics collection
The collection of the performance metrics of the different parts of the complete
solution, as well as the monitoring of the made requests, are critical to determin-
ing the overall performance of the frameworks. The identity provider server and
Hibox server had their system performance metrics gathered separately from each
other, while the machine running the simulated end users compiled an overview,
containing e.g. the request timings and error rate, of all generated requests.
4.4.1 Request metrics
The metrics of the request resulting from the authentication flows are recorded on
the machine simulating the user agents. The raw requests were recorded by the
JMeter application, which also then composed an overview.
The JMeter application compiled overview contained the throughput per second,
average bytes sent and received, average request response time and request error
rate. These were stored away after every test scenario to be examined and visual-
ized.
4.4.2 Resource monitoring
The system resources on both the identity provider server and the Hibox server
was monitored. Different available collection tools were tested, but in the end, the
command line application "top" was used to record the state of the system at a
set interval during the execution of the tests. This application was chosen because
it was lightweight enough not to interfere unnecessarily with the results, as well
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as the ability to be able to visualize what resources were used by which program,
including itself.
The system-wide memory usage of the servers was monitored during the tests.
The RAM used by an idle system was recorded to see the increase that comes from
different scenarios. The idle system RAM was recorded after the Java virtual ma-
chine on both the identity provider server and Hibox server had been running for a
while, this to make sure the idle level of RAM is a good baseline to compare against
when calculating the increase during the tests.
The CPU usage of the servers was monitored and stored to later be more closely
examined. The CPU utilization of the identity provider server and Hibox server
were recorded separately. The processor usage of the identity provider server was
gathered by looking at the CPU usage of the system, and how much was used by the
processes of the Gluu identity server. The Hibox server also had its CPU utilization
recorded and examined. The processor usage of Hibox Systems’s solution, along
with its underlying database, was monitored using the same approach.
4.5 Evaluation of the experimental setups
One possible threat to the validity of the results in this thesis is the different im-
plementations of the frameworks. This thesis intends to evaluate the frameworks
in general and not caring about any specific implementation. The most simple im-
plementations were the ones chosen to be tested, but the degree of efficiency of the
chosen ones if they were to be compared to each other is unclear. Different imple-
mentations could be compared to each other to minimize the effect this may have on
the results, but this would be an unreasonable effort within the scope of this thesis.
The collection of CPU utilization on the identity provider server and the Hibox
server may also pose a threat. The CPU utilization is collected at certain intervals
during the executions of the tests. The servers included in these tests had all their
unnecessary background services shut down and only the CPU utilization of rel-
evant processes is recorded, but there is always an inherent unpredictability in any
multi-tasking operating system [53]. These reasons may all lead to inaccuracies in
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the results of the tests. This inaccuracy in CPU measurements could be minimized
by running the tests repeatedly over a longer time span. All tests are run ten times
to gather enough data for the results of the experiments to be accurate, while still
being feasible to examine considering the extent of this thesis.
The measurement of the RAM utilization of the system may pose a threat. The
RAM is collected at a set interval, which introduces the same possible lack of ac-
curacy as for the CPU collection. In addition, both the identity provider server and
the Hibox server make use of java, with only some relevant processes outside the
Java virtual machine (JVM). The JVM garbage collector tries to predict what the
memory footprint of the program will be in the future. The JVM garbage collector
algorithm could be configured to reduce the effect it has on the results, but this is
not feasible within the scope of this thesis [54].
Finally, networking introduces variable delays and occasional random errors
that also may be a threat. The impact this has on the results by keeping a minimal
number of entities connected to the network as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The delays
present in a real-world scenario, where the requests are going over the Internet, and
how that is shown on the resource usage on the entities may be very different from
this local test scenario. In addition, the load put on any specific entity depends on
how many requests the other entities manages to handle and forward. One way to
minimize this threat and identify possible bottlenecks is to make sure only one of
the servers are running at a time, with both the user agent and other server having
their requests simulated. This thesis focuses on the performance of the system as
a whole, so these threats are considered when the results of the tests are examined,
but the impact on the results is, considering the scope of this thesis, not deemed to
be large enough to warrant multiple tests where all parts except for one would be
simulated.
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5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter, the integration is examined and the used platforms, solutions and
libraries are presented. Finally, the authentication flow of the implemented solution
is analyzed thoroughly.
The implementation described here is the integration of a centralized authen-
tication and authorization solution with Hibox Systems’s administration tool. The
tool is almost exclusively written in Java, therefore, all integrations make use of
Java libraries. The integrations are with SAML and OAuth 2.0, with OpenID Con-
nect as an identity layer. The reasoning for choosing only these frameworks for the
implementation is presented in the previous chapter. The identity provider server
is, during the testing phase, the Gluu identity and access management server [50].
There are many possible solutions for the identity provider server, and the Gluu
Server is chosen for the testing phase because of its support for both SAML and
OpenID Connect. This should reduce the inherent differences present during the
testing of the resulting implementations. Potential identity provider solutions will
be discussed extensively with Hibox Systems before enabling the system on a cus-
tomer server.
5.1 Platform
Most parts of the resulting system are written in java and can, therefore, in theory,
be run on any operating system that can run the Java virtual machine (JVM). There
are however some limiting factors of both the identity provider server and Hibox
Systems’s solution that led to a Unix based operating system.
The identity provider server is running the Gluu identity and access management
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server [50], which is mainly built of different Java parts, with Jetty as the Java HTTP
server and Java servlet container. There are however many separate parts included
in the Gluu Server, for instance the users are stored in a separate LDAP directory
and the web view is separate from the API exposed by the system. All of these parts
work together, and many assumptions are made by the system to make them run
smoothly together, namely where to find different parts and how to communicate
with them if they are running. These assumptions bind the Gluu Server to only run
on Linux based operating systems. The Gluu Server was during testing, therefore,
deployed on a system running Ubuntu 18.04.
Hibox System’s solution is almost exclusively written in Java, with Tomcat as
the Java web server environment. This means that it would certainly be possible to
make it run on any operating system, but certain assumptions about the underlying
system are made by the solution. These assumptions, such as the system paths to
resources, lead to that the solution runs only on Unix based operating system, if
one does not want to do extra configurations and troubleshooting. For the purpose
of this thesis, Hibox System’s solution will be deployed on a system with Ubuntu
18.04 as its operating system.
5.2 Integration overview
The implementation is done by using publicly available Java libraries to enable
SAML and OpenID Connect, through OAuth 2.0, as valid methods of authentica-
tion. During the initial configuration, a trust relationship is established between the
centralized identity provider server and Hibox Systems’s solution.
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code authorization grant type was used for the
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect integration. The SAML solution was based on
a Shibboleth server integrated with the Gluu authentication server solution. The
frameworks are linked with the authentication system already present in the Hibox
Systems’s solution. The details of Hibox System’s authentication are omitted for
security reasons.
The OpenID Connect client was in the end implemented without using any pre-
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viously available libraries due to the lack of solutions that were able to integrate with
Hibox System’s platform without requiring long dependency chains to be added to
the system. One of the OpenID Connect implementations that were successfully
integrated with Hibox System’s authentication system, and that was most efficient
during the authentication of one user, broke down if more simultaneous users were
added, due to the fact that the same client was used to send all requests. This was the
"Google OAuth Client Library for Java" [55], which was re-implemented without
using the library, as it gave a completely offset perspective of the capabilities of the
framework.
The integration had the OpenID Connect identity provider hardcoded, along
with the shared key used during the final token exchange. The OpenID Connect
client had the Authorization Code grant type as the only enabled flow to ensure that
the secure code exchange flow was used. The same flow was also the only enabled
one on the identity provider server.
The SAML client of the system is based on "Dead Simple SAML 2.0 Client"
[56]. The library was integrated with Hibox System’s solution by adding the neces-
sary endpoints and handling the requests and responses with the functions included
in the library. The SAML HTTP POST binding [57], one of the most common
SAML bindings, was used during the execution of the flow.
The SAML client had the path to the metadata XML on the identity provider
server hardcoded during the integration and test. The trust relationship was es-
tablished between the SAML client and SAML identity provider by sharing the
metadata files and registering the client on the identity provider server.
The most vital part of the authentication, for both of the frameworks, happens
on the identity provider server. As long as the service provider can verify if the
identity provider is the trusted party, the authentication can be relied on. The ac-
tual logic on the client-side is relatively simple, which makes the integration rather
straightforward.
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5.3 Authentication flows
The exact authentication flows used in the implementation have a massive impact
on the results collected from the executions of the tests. Both SAML and OpenID
Connect support a multitude of different possible flows. The most commonly re-
commended authentication flows were chosen for both of the different frameworks.
The chosen flows were verified to be among the most secure available, while still
being supported by most libraries and other solution. This to verify that the tests are
representative of real-world scenarios.
In an effort to simulate normal end user authentication flows as closely as pos-
sible, the user is assumed to have authorized the identity server to let the service
provider access necessary information prior to the initiation of the flow. In a real-
world application, this happens only once during the first interaction with the ser-
vice or through automatic authorization due to provider wide policy. In addition,
the authentication flow assumes that the session of the end user is not already au-
thenticated with the service provider or identity provider.
5.3.1 OpenID Connect flow
The implemented OpenID Connect authentication flow is visualized in Figure 5.1.
The illustrated flow assumes that the end user’s user agent does not have an already
authenticated session with any of the servers in the system. The authentication
flow follows the Authorization Code grant type flow of the OAuth 2.0 specification.
Only the Authorization Code grant type was implemented during the integration of
Hibox Systems’s solution. The Authentication Code authentication flow was also
the only enabled flow on the identity provider server to confirm that only that flow
is accepted. This was done to guarantee that the secure back channel was used for
the sensitive OAuth 2.0 access token.
The flow is initiated with an initial request to the desired service that has been
configured as an OpenID Connect client with the identity provider. The example in
Figure 5.1 shows an initial request to an admin page of the service provider. The
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Figure 5.1: OpenID Connect authentication flow.
response on the initial request is a redirect to the identity provider, as long as the
session of the user agent of the end user does not already have an authenticated
session with the service provider.
The user agent is redirected to a previously configured authorization endpoint
on the identity provider server. The request contains a set of parameters included in
the query string appended to the request URL. These parameters are used to define
the client id, callback URL, scopes, expected response type and a string represent-
ing the current state of the session. The client id is required to be configured with
the identity provider and specifies which client will be allowed to request the access
token if the authentication flow continues. The OpenID Connect callback URL is
the URL to which the user will be redirected upon successful authentication with
the identity provider. The callback URL is expected to be configured with the client
with the given client id on the identity provider server. The provided scopes are re-
quired to contain "openid" to specify that the OpenID Connect flow is used. Other
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scopes may be included to expand what information is shared with the service pro-
vider. The response type is required to be "code" to initiate an Authorization Code
flow, which is the only enabled flow by both the identity provider and service pro-
vider. The string representing the state can be used by the service provider to bring
back the past state of the application when the user is returned, as well as to prevent
cross-site request forgery attacks [58].
The end user would be redirected from the authorization endpoint to the OpenID
Connect callback endpoint on the service provider if the user would have an active
authenticated session on the identity provider. If the end user is not already authen-
ticated with the identity provider, as it is assumed in the flow in Figure 5.1, then
the user is redirected to the identity provider login page. The end user then has to
provide a valid combination of username and password to verify his identity with
the identity provider.
After the identity provider successfully authenticates the end user, the user is re-
directed to the OpenID Connect callback endpoint provided by the service provider,
as long as the callback URL is verified with both the identity provider and service
provider for the client in question. An authorization code is included in the query
string of the redirect URL. The callback endpoint parses the authorization code and
sends it to the identity provider token endpoint along with a shared secret, to verify
the identity of the service provider. If the identity provider can verify the request,
then it supplies the service provider with an access token and an id token.
The current session of the user agent of the end user is authenticated with the
service provider if the id token can be successfully verified. The user can then
access the service on behalf of the user identified in the id token. Finally, the end
user is redirected to the initially requested resource.
5.3.2 SAML flow
The SAML authentication flow used in the implementation and tests is illustrated
in Figure 5.2. The demonstrated authentication flow is a service provider-initiated
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Figure 5.2: SAML authentication flow.
flow, which is triggered by the user agent of the end user accessing the service
provider without an authenticated session [59]. The SAML metadata XML files are
assumed to be shared between the service provider and identity provider prior to the
initiation of the flow. Both the service provider and identity provider make use of a
SAML HTTP POST binding when executing the SAML authentication flow.
The initial request is sent to the desired service, that has configured a SAML
identity provider. The response contains a redirect to the login page on the service
provider, as long as the user agent of the end user does not have an authenticated
session with the service provider.
The SAML login page initiates a SAML request to the configured SAML single
sign-on endpoint. The SAML authentication request sent to the identity provider
contains information about the issuer, name policy and signature all unified and
represented by a base64 encoded XML request. The issuer is described with a
unique identifier specific to the identity provider to make sure the request is only
handled by its intended target. The name policy describes in what format the SAML
43
Ken Erikson
client expects the name identifier of the end user if the authentication succeeds. The
signature and certificate included in the request can be used to verify the integrity
of the entire request. The signature of the request will not be the same as the expec-
ted value if the request has been tampered with in any way. The certificates have
been shared between the SAML identity provider and SAML client beforehand to
establish a trust relationship.
Assuming the user agent is not already authenticated with the identity provider,
the response redirects the end user to the login page of the identity provider as
long as the SAML authentication request had its integrity successfully verified. The
end user then has to provide valid credentials to the identity provider to then be
redirected back to the service provider.
The identity provider sends back a SAML response, including a SAML asser-
tion. The response is described with XML and base64 encoded. The information
is sent in XML format to follow the SAML specification. Base64 encoding is used
to ensure the correct characters are transmitted and the transported data can be re-
ceived without modification [60].
The SAML assertion, included in the SAML response, contains the conditions
and attributes of the successful authentication. The conditions of the authentication
include restrictions such as the time window within which the authenticated session
is valid, and the authentication will be invalid before and after the specified times.
The assertion may also limit the audience for which the authentication is valid,
meaning that only the specified service providers should accept the authentication.
The attributes included in the assertion are the attributes that were requested in
the authentication request. Only attributes that the user can access and the SAML
identity provider has configured to be available are included. The attributes are
in the name format specified in the initial request to the identity provider. The
username or some other unique identifier of the authenticated user is a required
attribute for the service provider to map the external user to an internal user on their
system.
Apart from the SAML assertion, the SAML response also contains informa-
tion about the SAML protocol, issuer, signature and status of authentication. The
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version of the SAML protocol that was used is specified at the beginning of the
response. The identity provider includes an identifier of the issuer of the response
to inform the service provider of which entity handled the request. The response,
including the assertion, should not be trusted unless its signature can be validated.
Information on the method used to sign the response, as well as the certificate of
the identity provider may be included in the response. This information can then be
used to verify the integrity of the entire response. The status of the authentication
is included in the response. The response contains a "Success" status code if the
credentials and the request could be verified. If the request was invalid in any way,
a status code of "Requester" would be returned. In case of an error on the identity
provider server, a response code of "Responder" would be returned. If the SAML
entities are using different versions a "VersionMismatch" status code is returned. In
addition to these general status codes, there might be a more descriptive status code
included, such as "UnknownPrincipal" and "InvalidNameIDPolicy" [61].
Finally, the user agent is redirected back to the initially requested service. As
long as the included assertion can be successfully verified by the service provider,
the end user then has completed the SAML authentication flow and has a valid
authenticated session with the service provider.
5.4 Challenges
There were different challenges during the implementation of the system. The chal-
lenges were due to the limitations following the requirements from Hibox Systems,
as well as the large number of available frameworks.
Hibox Systems’s solution used Gradle [62] as a build and dependency manage-
ment tool, which caused some problems mostly due to unfamiliarity with the more
advanced features of the tool. Gradle was configured in such a way that all depend-
encies had to be available either locally or on Hibox Systems’s own artifact server.
There was no success in adding the Maven repository as a fallback without having
the build fail, and therefore all libraries, including all dependency chains, had to be
downloaded for each protocol implementation that would be evaluated.
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Included in the requirements of the implementation was to keep external library
usage to a minimum to limit the number of artifacts that Hibox Systems are required
to keep on their artifact server. There were some challenges during the finding of vi-
able libraries. Simple libraries are often small because they depend on a multitude of
other libraries, which made them not viable for the given requirements. Many pos-
sible libraries would also drag in different versions of dependencies already present
in the system, which led to much confusion in Gradle.
One challenge was that is was difficult to find the most efficiently implemented
versions of the protocols. The different implementations first had their code in-
spected in their respective repository to ensure that their implementation would suit
the use case and requirements. The few most promising frameworks were then in-
tegrated with Hibox Systems’s authentication system. Some were not successfully
integrated and were left out at this stage. In the end, the best performing imple-
mentation was chosen for each of the frameworks chosen to be further investigated.
Finally, a challenge was to ensure that the chosen frameworks were comparable dur-
ing testing, so that the features of the frameworks were tested and not the specific
implementation. There was no easy way to ensure this, but the most straightfor-
ward and efficient implementations were chosen. The different frameworks should
not give a false view of the throughput and error rate just because of the design
choices of the specific implementation.
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6 RESULTS ANALYSIS
The results of the tests, simulations and implementations that are presented in this
thesis are discussed and analyzed in this chapter. Conclusions are inferred from the
collected data with a focus on how the results differ depending on which framework
was used in the implementation.
Firstly, the implementation and the arisen problems are briefly examined. Later,
all data collected during the tests are presented in graphs, which are then thoroughly
analyzed. The frameworks are compared with each other based on the different
defined metrics. The metrics that would impact the user experience directly, such
as erroneous response rate and throughput, are weighted when drawing conclusions
from the data.
6.1 Implementation overview
The implementation of the centralized authentication system was successful and
a complete solution, with all necessary parts, was available in an offline network.
Many open-source solutions and libraries were used to construct a working system
that could be reliably tested. The choice of using available solutions as much as
possible was based on trying to keep the quality of the implementations as close to
those used in a real-world scenario as possible. Only the custom parts necessary to
integrate SAML and OpenID Connect with the existing Hibox Systems’s solution
was implemented.
The OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect client/side and integration with Hibox Sys-
tems’s solution was in the end implemented without using any OAuth 2.0 specific
libraries. This due to many of the simple libraries available were either unsuited
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for the intended use case or not possible to configure without rewriting much of
the logic that was deeply integrated into the libraries. One library that was simple
to integrate worked well for a small number of users, but locked the process when
more than one request had to be handled at the same time by separate threads. The
limited amount of logic needed to implement an OpenID Connect with only the
Authorization Code grant type functioning was deemed to be simple enough to be
implemented, while still being able to attribute the results of the tests to the capab-
ilities of the framework and not the specific implementation. The configuration of
the Gluu identity provider server worked without any problems. The identity pro-
vider, following the clearly defined OpenID Connect protocol, exposed an endpoint
containing all information needed to configure the client.
The SAML integration used available libraries to establish a working SAML
client. The chosen libraries worked well with the Hibox System’s solution. The
configuration of the Gluu identity provider server was more complicated with the
SAML solution than with the OpenID Connect one, though. The client XML
metadata to be provided to the identity provider server had to be manually created.
The identity provider error logs were not descriptive of what problems had occurred,
which led to that many different versions of the metadata had to be provided until
one was accepted by the SAML back end.
When comparing the two authentication flows with each other, it is clear that
there are more SAML requests, and that the number of bytes transmitted by the
requests is much larger than for the OpenID Connect flow. The OpenID Connect
is clearly more lightweight in that sense. It should be noted during the evaluation
that all of the SAML requests are executed by the user agent, while some requests
are passed directly between the service provider and identity provider during the
OpenID Connect flow.
6.2 Evaluation overview
The performance of the system in general and the metrics collected during the test
are discussed here. All tests were repeated ten times with 1,2,5,10,20,50,100,200,500
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Figure 6.1: Throughput of users.
and 1000 simulated users for both SAML and OpenID Connect authentication flows.
The initial login requests were sent over ten seconds, and run until all requests had
been handled, successfully or not.
6.2.1 User throughput
The successful throughput of simulated users per second is visible in Figure 6.1.
The throughput is very similar between the different frameworks for a smaller num-
ber of simulated users. Up until fifty simultaneous users, OpenID Connect has only
a slight advantage over SAML. The advantage then rises from less than five users
per second to almost 70 users per second at 200 users.
Both frameworks, with the given hardware, are struggling to handle more than
500 simultaneous users. This can be seen in Figure 6.1 where both solutions, es-
pecially the OpenID Connect one, have a drastic fall in the number of successfully
authenticated users per second. For SAML, the throughput falls from 55 users per
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Figure 6.2: Average response times.
second to around 20 users per second. For OpenID Connect, the throughput falls
from 124 users per second all the way down to less than 10 users per second.
The reason why the throughput is not at its highest with one simulated user may
be because the servers in the system are most efficient when they get to process a
bulk of users, as long as the server is not overburdened by the load of the users. This
means that the initialization done by the first request becomes an insignificant part
of the average throughput time when the number of users rises enough.
6.2.2 Response time
The response time of the different frameworks are visualized in Figure 6.2. The time
to get a response on a request is kept on reasonable levels until around 100 users
for SAML and 200 users for OpenID Connect. After that, there is a huge spike
in average response time. The timings for simulated users authenticating using
OpenID Connect spikes up higher than for users with SAML. OpenID Connect
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Figure 6.3: Average response times for up to 100 users.
reaches 49 seconds at 500 users and 63 seconds at 1000 users. Simulated users
using SAML only reach 13 seconds at 500 users and 47 seconds at 1000 users.
The notable difference in the average response time for OpenID Connect com-
pared to SAML may be due to the difference in implementations and where the
bottleneck is in the system. The part of the system that seems to be the limiting
factor in the case of the OpenID Connect flow is the Gluu Server, which has its
CPU utilization rate rising to its maximum already at 100 simultaneous users as
visualized in Figure 6.8. The SAML solution looks to be limited mostly by the Hi-
box server, as can be seen by its large CPU utilization in Figure 6.9, especially for
100 users or more.
In Figure 6.3 the response times are shown again, but only for simultaneous
users up to 100. The responses times during this part of the test were not clearly
visible in Figure 6.2 due to the sharp rise in the timings when the system got over-
whelmed with users. In addition, the timings for less than 100 simultaneous users
is the most representative of a generic use case, and must, therefore, be unambigu-
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Figure 6.4: Error rate of authentication requests.
ously shown to be able to help draw accurate conclusions from the data.
The OpenID Connect had noticeably lower response times in the whole interval
from one to 100 simulated users compared to SAML. The average response times
for users using the OpenID Connect flow started at 150 ms at one user, which fell to
76 ms for 50 users and up to 120 ms for 100 users. The response times for the users
using the SAML flow started at a higher 280 ms for one user and stayed around the
same until it suddenly jumped from 290 ms at 50 users to 830 ms at 100 users.
The reason for the sudden increase response times in the case of SAML may be
due to a bottleneck in the system. The bottleneck is most likely to be in the Hibox
server, which has an almost 100% CPU utilization as can be seen in Figure 6.9 at
100 simultaneous simulated users.
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6.2.3 Error rate
The error rate of authentication requests can be a good indicator for when a sys-
tem is under too much load and the recorded error rate for the different number
of simulated users is shown in Figure 6.4. The error rate should preferably stay at
0% and a huge number of simultaneous users should only experience a rise in the
response time from the system. In reality, any system needs to handle errors, but
keeping the error rate low stops the system from having to handle retry requests.
The implementation during the test did not send any retry requests on failure.
The error rate is kept at 0% for up to 50 simulated users authenticating with
SAML and for up to 100 users using the OpenID Connect flow. The error rate goes
up to 3% for SAML at 100 simulated users. At 200 users the rate was 19% for
OpenID Connect and 26% for SAML. The framework with the higher error rate
then swaps to OpenID Connect. For 500 to 1000 users the error rate of OpenID
Connect rises from 64% to 90% and the error rate of SAML goes from 55% to
82%.
6.2.4 Data rate
The average rate of sent and received data by the simulated users can be seen in
Figure 6.5. The rate of transmitted bytes is an indicator of the efficiency of the
system and can then be compared to the total throughput of users. It can be noted
that some of the requests are directly between the service provider and identity
provider during the OpenID Connect flow, as opposed to the SAML flow where all
requests are passed through the user agent.
The data rates increase with the same slope for both frameworks up until 100
users, with SAML having a small edge. For OpenID Connect the rate continues to
rise until it reaches 200 users. The rate for SAML goes down slightly in the interval
between 100 and 200 users, but both the rate at which bytes are sent and received is
still higher than for OpenID Connect.
The transmission rate falls sharper for OpenID Connect compared to SAML
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Figure 6.5: Bytes transmitted per second for authentication requests.
when testing 200 users compared to 500 users. The rate OpenID Connect users
receive bytes falls from 1670 KB per second to 116 KB per second and the rate
bytes are sent falls from 725 KB per second to 40 KB per second. The rate SAML
users receive bytes falls from 2060 KB per second to 670KB per second and the
rate bytes are sent falls from 980 KB per second to 320 KB per second. The fall of
the transmission rate indicates how severely the systems are congested by a rising
number of simulated users depending on the framework used.
The average data transmission rate during the OpenID Connect authentication
flow is lower on average than during the SAML flow. This could mean that the
system is more efficient when handling the SAML flow, but it has to be compared
to the relative throughput of users. When comparing the average data rate, as visu-
alized in Figure 6.5, to the rate of successfully authenticated users shown in Figure
6.1, it can be inferred that the data rate is higher for SAML, while OpenID Connect
has a higher rate of successfully authenticated users. This means that SAML re-
quires more bytes per successfully authenticated user relative to OpenID Connect.
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Figure 6.6: RAM increase on the Gluu identity server relative to a baseline.
For instance, at 200 simultaneous users, 1670 kB per second is received by OpenID
Connect users while 124 users are authenticated per second. For SAML users 55
users per second are authenticated and 2060 kB is received per second at the same
number of users.
6.2.5 RAM increase
The Random-access memory (RAM) usage increase on the Gluu identity server
relative to a baseline is visualized in Figure 6.6. The baseline is from a system that
has been idle after successfully handling 100 logins successfully to get the JVM
ready and optimized for handling the upcoming requests, as it would be in a normal
real-world use scenario.
The RAM increase is rising at about the same rate over the whole span of dif-
ferent numbers of users for both frameworks. There is an increase of around 300
MB for one to ten simulated users, with the SAML framework being more efficient
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Figure 6.7: RAM increase on the Hibox server relative to a baseline.
by a small, but not insignificant, amount. From ten to 100 users, the increase in
RAM rises at very similar rates for both frameworks. SAML reaches the peak of
1260 MB RAM usage already at 200 simulated users, and then starts to drop until it
is down to 890 MB at 1000 users. The RAM increase during the OpenID Connect
flows is rising at a constant rate until it reaches 710 MB at 200 users, and then it
rises sharply to 1440 MB at 1000 users.
The RAM usage increase of the Hibox server is visible in Figure 6.7. The
baseline to which the increase is compared to was decided by using the same method
as with the Gluu Server. The system was allowed to idle and stabilize after 200 users
had been handled.
The increase is minimal for both frameworks with the RAM increase lying at
around 100 MB until the number of simultaneous users rises to 100. The average
increase of the OpenID Connect in the interval from one to 100 users was 79 MB,
while the SAML framework had an average of 95 MB in that same interval of users.
Both SAML and OpenID Connect see a similar rise from 100 to 500 simulated users
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Figure 6.8: CPU utilization of the Gluu identity server.
to around 300 MB. The RAM usage increase of the OpenID Connect clients then
rises to only 330 MB at 1000 users, while the SAML framework sees an increase
all the way to 780 MB.
It can be noted that for users following the SAML flow, in Figure 6.6 the RAM
usage decreases between 500 to 1000 users, perhaps due to patterns detected by
the JVM garbage collector. The RAM usage increases in Figure 6.7 in the same
interval.
6.2.6 CPU utilization
The average CPU usage of the Gluu identity server during the test execution is
shown in Figure 6.8. The CPU usage on the identity provider during the testing
consisted mostly of the Java virtual machine, as well as some use by the Apache
server which provided some requested resources.
The identity provider CPU usage difference between simulated SAML and OpenID
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Figure 6.9: CPU utilization of the Hibox server.
Connect is minimal from one to five users, with SAML being slightly better. From
five to fifty simultaneously simulated users OpenID Connect is noticeably lighter
on resources, with around 15% less total CPU usage compared to SAML. Both
frameworks are struggling to handle more than 200 simultaneous users and stay
around 90-95% CPU utilization, but OpenID Connect reaches this level already at
around 100 users. The percentage not quite reaching 100% may be due to the im-
plementation of the Gluu Server not being able to handle the users in an optimal
multi-threaded fashion, meaning that one crucial handler is fully utilizing its avail-
able core, and can not successfully start new threads faster than requests are coming
in.
The processing power used on the Hibox server was split between the complete
Java tomcat system and the back end database. The database was MariaDB, which
is a MySQL community fork [63].
The average CPU utilization of the Hibox server during the testing phase can
be seen in Figure 6.9. What is clear is that the CPU usage, in general, is less for
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the server when it is handling OpenID Connect users, rather than SAML users. The
difference is not too large between the two frameworks for under ten users, but the
resource usage then rises to close to 100% utilization for when handling more than
100 SAML users. This, while the CPU usage is only slowly rising from 5% to 15%
when going from one to 1000 simulated OpenID Connect users.
The sharp reduction in CPU utilization for when 500 SAML users were pro-
cessed at the same time can be attributed to congestion on the identity server after
the initial request is sent to the identity server, so that the Hibox server has more
time to process each user. Why the percentage goes back to 100% when reaching
1000 almost simultaneous users may be because the Hibox server now fails to send
the initial request to the identity provider server due to the Hibox server now being
under too much load to successfully redirect all of the initial login requests.
6.3 Summary
Because the intended use case of the Hibox System’s solution is for a small number
of users, realistically under fifty, the focus will be given to the results of the frame-
work in the interval from one to fifty simultaneous users. In practice, often no more
than five users will have to be handled simultaneously, but crucial systems should
be able to handle the realistic worst-case scenario.
The OpenID Connect seems to give an overall smoother experience for the end
user at a small number of users, compared to SAML. The most notable metrics
of this are the results from the response timing and user throughput tests, where
OpenID Connect was clearly more efficient than SAML. Error rate and overall re-
source usage were overall very similar for both frameworks, at least for a smaller
number of simultaneous users.
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7 FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, different authentication and authorization protocols and frameworks
have been compared with each other. They have been evaluated on the basis of what
framework or protocol would be most suited for a single sign-on server with a lim-
ited number of users and fairly strict security requirements. The frameworks chosen
to be examined in this thesis were OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML, LDAP,
Kerberos and RADIUS. These frameworks were selected based on their heavily
scrutinized security features and general widespread use.
The frameworks were initially evaluated solely on a theoretical level with a fo-
cus on accessibility and user-friendliness. Furthermore, the complexity of the con-
figuration and integration with another system was investigated.
7.1 Future work
This thesis has focused on a small subset of available frameworks and, while these
have been chosen with great consideration, some other viable omitted frameworks
could be compared to the chosen ones. Also, the testing of prototypes with end
users has been very limited and could certainly be expanded upon.
The implementations and integration done as a part of this thesis are not ready to
be deployed in a real production environment, but following how the system func-
tions under such circumstances would provide more reliable data for the comparison
between the different frameworks. The lack of such data led to a focus on theory
and simulations to gain an understanding of how the frameworks would most likely
function in such an environment.
The threats to the validity of the conclusions presented in this thesis could be
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minimized by running the test more times and with a variety of implementations to
ensure that the capabilities of the frameworks are being tested and measured instead
of specific implementations. Also, different methods of metrics collection could be
evaluated to determine what method would be the most accurate, as well as the
precision of the measurements.
7.2 Conclusions
Out of the chosen frameworks, OAuth 2.0 with OpenID Connect as an identity layer
was the most suited for the problem at hand. Both Kerberos and RADIUS proved to
be too complex for both the users and administrators, and are relatively heavy on re-
sources due to the many included advanced features. SAML and LDAP were quite
straightforward for the user, but the setup and configuration were quite cumbersome
for the administrator. SAML also included all necessary identity provider features.
OAuth 2.0 was very user-friendly, as well as easy to integrate with available solu-
tions. The OpenID Connect identity layer was simple to add on top of OAuth 2.0 to
make it a standardized authentication solution and not only usable for authorization.
The lightweight resulting system had great usability, features and security that were
meeting all of the requirements.
Many advantages come with using a single sign-on server. It leads to a more se-
cure and manageable system for both the users of the system and the administrators,
mostly because of fewer passwords for the user to memorize and a smaller number
of accounts for the administrators to manage. There are many different ways to im-
plement such a solution, but for Hibox Systems’s use case, OAuth 2.0 and OpenID
Connect are together the best-suited frameworks out of the chosen ones.
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SAMMANFATTNING
CENTRALISERAD AUTENTISERING OCH
AUKTORISERING
Introduktion
För enheter på nätet har det alltid varit viktigt att kunna verifiera identiteten sinse-
mellan. Det finns många olika lösningar och förslag på hur detta bör gå till, men det
som ofta används i praktiken är fortfarande en kombination av användarnamn och
lösenord. Denna avhandling ämnar utforska olika sätt där samlad inloggning kan
användas för att öka säkerheten genom att minska antalet inloggningssystem och på
samma gång minska antalet lösenord som varje användare måste hålla koll på.
Avhandlingen görs som en del av ett projekt med Hibox Systems, ett företag som
tillhandahåller omfattande tv- och underhållningslösningar för hotell, internetleve-
rantörer och sjukhus. Företaget har undersökt olika möjligheter att på ett säkert sätt
försnabba underhåll och utvecklingsåtgärder genom att ge sina anställda tillgång till
en centraliserad inloggningsserver. Denna server skulle ge rätt personal tillgång till
andra konfigurerade externa servrar enligt behov, både enklare och mera flexibelt
än tidigare.
Till projektet hör att utvärdera olika tillgängliga ramverk och tjänster som upp-
fyller både Hibox Systems funktionella krav samt deras säkerhetskrav. Till dessa
krav hör att endast personal med tillräckliga rättigheter har tillgång till olika kun-
ders servrar och att eventuella personalbyten kan leda till snabba uppdateringar av
nämnda rättigheter. Utöver detta är kravet också att man effektivt kan reagera på
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förändringar i säkerhetskraven.
Ramverk
Det finns en mängd olika ramverk tillgängliga för autentisering och auktorisering.
På grund av den mängd ramverk som finns beskrivna i litteratur och tillgängliga på
nätet kommer i denna avhandling endast ett litet urval av alla ramverk att behandlas.
I denna avhandling har fokus lagts på att hitta ett varierande sortiment av ramverk
som har blivit noggrant granskade av säkerhetsexperter samt visat sig fungera bra i
praktiken.
De utvalda ramverken är OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML, LDAP, Kerberos
och RADIUS.
OAuth 2.0 och OpenID Connect är båda beroende av varandra på grund av att
OpenID Connect är ett säkerhetslager som kan läggas till OAuth 2.0. OAuth 2.0 är
ett industriledande protokoll för auktorisering och har med OpenID Connect en full-
skalig autentiserings- och auktoriseringslösning. Utan OpenID Connect är OAuth
2.0 endast ett auktoriseringsramverk, vilket innebär att det inte innehåller ett stan-
dardiserat flöde för hur inloggningen till systemet bör genomföras.
SAML är en standard som definierar ett ramverk för hur entiteter sinsemellan
kan utbyta säkerhetsinformation i ett XML-format. XML är en standard för hur man
kan skriva text som enkelt kan skickas och förstås mellan olika entiteter.
LDAP är ett protokoll som beskriver kommunikation med en katalogtjänst. En
katalogtjänst är ett system som innehåller och hanterar till exempel namn, adress
och användares rättigheter.
Kerberos definierar ett protokoll som bygger på ömsesidig autentisering, vilket
innebär att både användaren och servicen kan vara säkra på att den andra parten är
den som den utger sig för att vara.
RADIUS bygger även den på ömsesidig autentisering och har historiskt sett an-
vänts främst av större företag för att begränsa åtkomst till och inom privata nätverk.
Olika ramverk har olika styrkor och svagheter, vilka tas upp och analyseras i
avhandlingen.
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Testning och implementation
De utvalda ramverken jämförs först enbart på en teoretisk nivå. De ramverk som
visar sig vara bäst sinsemellan i teoridelen testas och implementeras vidare. Detta
görs för att kunna lägga större fokus på de ramverk som passar för det uppsatta målet
för denna avhandling. De mest lämpliga ramverken integreras med Hibox Systems
interna system, med fokus på att få fungerande och testbara prototyper. Prototyperna
testas med betoning på genomströmning, användarvänlighet och säkerhet.
Resultat och analys
Utgående från undersökningen av ramverken och testningen av integrationerna kan
man se hur ramverken lämpar sig bättre och sämre i olika situationer, beroende på
vilka säkerhets- och funktionella krav som följs.
Kerberos och RADIUS visade sig båda vara ytterst komplexa för både använda-
re och administratörer. Problem som inkorrekta klockor och oklara felmeddelanden
kan med dessa ramverk leda till onödigt komplicerad felsökning. Den extra säkerhet
som dessa erbjuder uppväger inte de komplikationer som de medför.
LDAP och SAML medförde liknande komplexitet, men inte på en samma skala
som de tidigare nämnda ramverken. SAML är lämpligare än LDAP för det givna
användningsfallet på grund av de funktionaliteter som SAML erbjuder. Detta bety-
der också att det i vissa omständigheter kan vara ett onödigt omfattande och tungt
ramverk.
OAuth 2.0 med OpenID Connect som säkerhetslager visade sig både i teorin
och i integreringstester vara det bästa av de utvalda ramverken för att bygga ett
effektivt och användarvänligt inloggningsflöde. Integreringen lyckades utan större
svårigheter tack vare de väldefinierade protokollen. Det kräver en del administrativt
arbete för att få systemet att fungera, men det relativt säkra inloggningsflödet kan
följas väldigt smidigt ur användarens synvinkel.
SAML och OAuth 2.0, med säkerhetslagret OpenID Connect, integrerades båda
med Hibox Systems interna lösningar. SAML var väldigt komplicerat att få konfi-
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gurerat ihop med det nuvarande systemet. OpenID Connect var överlag lättare att få
att fungera, men vissa komplikationer uppstod även där.
En större genomströmming av användare kunde på samma hårdvara åstadkom-
mas med hjälp av OpenID Connect jämfört med SAML. Resursanvändingen på
servrarna som körde integrationen var lägre för OpenID Connect än för SAML.
Processoranvändningen på dessa servrar var betydligt mindre för OpenID Connect,
medan minnesanvändningen var väldigt lika för de bägge ramverken. OpenID Con-
nect visade sig vara bättre än SAML på grund av lättare konfigurering och underhåll
samt genomgående effektivare system.
Slutsats
Baserat på resultaten från denna avhandling kan det konstateras att det ramverk som
lämpar sig bäst för det syfte som presenterades i introduktionen är OAuth 2.0 med
OpenID Connect som säkerhetslager liggande ovanpå.
RADIUS och Kerberos valdes bort ur de ursprungligt valda ramverken i ett re-
lativt tidigt skede av testningen på grund av den oproportionerligt stora komplexitet
dessa ramverk inför utan att tillföra tillräckligt med kompenserande positiva funk-
tionaliteter och säkerhetsrelaterade fördelar.
LDAP och SAML visade sig fungera relativt bra ut säkerhetsmässig synvinkel.
Dessa två ramverk var dock inte lika användarvänliga och lätta att konfigurera som
OAuth 2.0. Av LDAP och SAML var det dock SAML som visade sig vara mest
lämpad.
OAuth 2.0 med OpenID Connect som säkerhetslager visade sig kräva relativt lite
resurser och var enkel att integrera med ett nuvarande system. Genomströmningen
var även bättre än de andra testade ramverken, och även konfigureringen var väldigt
okomplicerad.
Det finns många fördelar med att erbjuda endast en inloggningsserver, både för
systemadministratörer och användare. Den kan även implementeras på många oli-
ka sätt, men för Hibox Systems ändamål kan man se att OAuth 2.0 och OpenID
Connect lämpar sig bäst bland de utvalda ramverken.
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